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Abstract— Malware authors attempt in an endless effort to find 
new methods to evade the malware detection engines. A popular 
method is the use of obfuscation technologies that change the 
syntax of malicious code while preserving the execution 
semantics. This leads to the evasion of signatures that are built 
based on the code syntax. In this paper, we propose a novel 
approach to develop an evasion-resistant malware signature. 
This signature is based on the malware’s execution profiles 
extracted from kernel data structure objects and neither uses 
malicious code syntax specific information code execution flow 
information. Thus, proposed signature is more resistant to 
obfuscation methods and resilient in detecting malicious code 
variants.  To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, 
a prototype signature generation tool called SigGENE is 
developed. The effectiveness of signatures generated by SigGENE 
evaluated using an experimental root kit-simulation tool that 
employs techniques commonly found in rootkits. This simulation-
tool is obfuscated using several different methods. In further 
experiments, real-world malware samples that have different 
variants with the same behavior used to verify the real-world 
applicability of the approach. The experiments show that the 
proposed approach is effective, not only in generating a signature 
that detects the malware and its variants and defeats different 
obfuscation methods, but also, in producing an execution profiles 
that can be used to characterize different malicious attacks. 
Keywords: Malware Behavior Profiling, Malware Signature, 
Signature-Based Detection, Kernel Data Structure. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Traditional signature-based detection is one of the most 
popular approaches to detect known malware in the anti-virus 
(AV) industry. It relies on extracting sequences of bytes from 
malicious code binaries that form a signature used to detect it. 
Unfortunately, advances in malware development have led to 
a variety of methods to evade malware detection signatures 
that rely on byte sequence pattern matching.   
A prevalent feature that is commonly used in modern 
malware to bypass signature-based engines is employing code 
obfuscation and packing technology [1, 2]. The term 
obfuscation describes the process of intentional tampering and 
manipulation of the malicious code syntax while preserving 
the malicious behavior semantics. Practically, packing, code 
re-ordering and junk code insertions are the most commonly 
used methods to subvert and evade signature-based detection 
engines [3, 4]. Further obfuscation methods include API 
obfuscation, in which unnecessary API calls are inserted in 
malicious binaries to impede malicious code analysis process 
and encounter code emulation [2].  Unfortunately, employing 
these methods in malware code, not only, hinder malware 
analysis and malware forensic investigation, but also, various 
malicious code variant programs can easily be generated. 
These malicious programs are capable of executing the 
original malicious payload, while being transparent to the 
original detection signatures.  
In essence, the intent of these obfuscation methods is to 
subvert features input used in signature development process. 
As a result, created signatures will be ineffective in detecting 
obfuscated malicious code. Particularly, signatures developed 
based on features prone to manipulation and obfuscation cause 
signature detection failures, whereas signatures developed 
based on features sensitive to tampering are resistant to 
obfuscation methods and evasions techniques. 
In this paper, a novel method is proposed to develop an 
evasion-resistant malware signature based on features that are 
sensitive to tampering and robust in detecting malware 
behavior. In the proposed approach, the characteristics of 
operating system kernel data structure objects [5] are used to 
develop malware signature instead of traditional signature that 
relies on byte sequence matching.     
The operating system kernel manages several data structure 
objects that describe and manage the operations of the 
programs being executed. The syntax and semantic of such 
data structure objects are defined by the operating system 
code. Tampering or modifying these kernel objects properties 
while programs are being executed can cause the operating 
system to crash or produces unpredictable behaviors. 
Furthermore, kernel objects are considered to be an analogous 
representation of code executed in the operating system 
kernel. Therefore, characteristics of kernel objects’ features 
are a potential source for deriving evasion-resistant malware 
signatures. 
 
The key idea of the proposed approach is to profile the 
invariant values of the kernel objects’ features that represent 
malicious code execution during malware dynamic analysis 
process in a controlled profiling environment. Profiled 
features, then, will be used to derive a robust malware 
detection signature.  
The process of features profiling is based on monitoring the 
malware information flow at different execution states, i.e. 
system call invocations. In each monitored execution state, 
there exists a unique pattern of features’ values in the kernel 
objects that characterize malware behaviors and values of 
these features uniquely describe the semantics of the malicious 
code execution state. As such, by aggregating all the values of 
kernel object’s features that are profiled during the malicious 
code execution process, we can detect invariants that precisely 
represent the malware execution.  These invariants are, then, 
used to develop a unique malware signature that is robust, 
sensitive to manipulation, and can detect malware variants and 
obfuscated malware samples.   
In this work, malware signature is developed based on 
profiling EPROCESS, a dynamic kernel object that is used to 
represent a running process in Windows operating systems. 
However, the proposed approach can easily be extended to 
profile other kernel objects types that represent various aspects 
of the program behavior. We monitor the dynamic changes to 
the EPROCESS object related to a malware in memory while 
malware’s code is being executed. Thereafter, an invariant 
identification technique called “data structure invariant 
detection” [7] is utilized to aggregate the profiled EPROCESS 
object throughout different execution states and determine 
invariants values from profiled object’s features. Determined 
invariants describe different properties of monitored object 
that hold over the life time of malware execution. An invariant 
in profiled EPROCESS object can, for example, be a specific 
value of a security Token that represents control access to a 
process object. Further, invariant can be a specific value of 
EPROCESS Flags that represent process execution flags.   
To evaluate the proposed approach, we implemented a 
prototype malware signature generation tool called SigGENE. 
The tool profiles values of EPROCESS kernel object features 
in a dynamic analysis environment [6]. This involves hooking 
the operating system API call table [8, 9] and building a 
custom kernel device driver in order to capture dynamic 
changes to EPROCESS features in the profiling phase.  
In the experimentation phase, we developed detection 
signatures for several real-world malware variants that belong 
to five different malware samples families and obfuscated 
using different techniques. In addition, we evaluated the 
proposed approach on our developed kernel-mode rootkit-
simulation program that features user-space process hiding. 
Developed rootkit-simulator has been obfuscated using three 
different techniques to verify the effectiveness of the 
generated signature in defeating different obfuscation 
methods. A number of the test malware variants effectively 
evade two different AV scanners that could not detect all 
malware variants. However, the proposed approach 
successfully detected all obfuscated variants in both real and 
simulated malicious samples. We further analyzed profiled 
data of kernel objects for each malware sample at each 
execution state, we argue that each profiled kernel object 
maintains a unique pattern of data traces that describe and 
determine the state currently being executed. Thus, by 
utilizing this observation, forensic identification of previously 
executed system calls is likely to be possible.    
 
At last, we state the contributions of this paper as follow: 
 An approach is proposed to develop a robust 
malware detection signature based on detected 
kernel data structure invariants that is evasion-
resistant to obfuscation techniques. 
 This approach automates the process of malware 
signature generation based on profiling kernel data 
structure objects monitored during the malware 
execution process. 
 A prototype malware signature generation tool is 
implemented to automate development of malware 
signatures through dynamic analysis and profiling of 
dynamic kernel data structure objects.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In 
section two, the system architecture of SigGENE is described. 
Section three presents the evaluation of the proposed approach. 
In section four, a brief discussion of the proposed approach is 
provided. In section five, we discuss the related work.  Finally, 
section six concludes the proposed approach. 
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
In this section, the proposed malicious kernel objects profiling 
approach is presented and assisted with the design and 
implementation of SigGENE. SigGENE is a prototype 
malware signature generation engine that profiles malicious 
kernel objects for executed malware sample and determines 
invariant kernel objects’ features values during malicious code 
execution. To perform malware behavior profiling, SigGENE 
monitors the kernel objects that belong to the malicious code 
in memory throughout utilizing a Virtual Machine Monitoring 
and Introspection (VMI) techniques [10]. Fundamentally, 
VMI employment in the proposed approach allows in 
monitoring the dynamic changes to the kernel objects’ features 
and forms the basis for profiling malicious code behavior and 
monitoring malware execution. An overview of SigGENE 
system design is depicted in Figure 1.  
The design model of SigGENE is comprised of two 
complementary modules. The first module is designated to: 1) 
Identify features in kernel objects that effectively contribute to 
robust signatures development. 2) Monitor dynamic changes 
to kernel object features in the context of malicious code 
execution and develop kernel objects’ profiles.  The module 
functionalities are implemented in Virtual Machine Monitor 
(VMM) and Kernel Object Profiler components in Fig 1. The 
inputs to previously mentioned components are definitions to 
kernel objects data structure as defined in the guest operating 
system code and locations of the kernel objects instances in 
the guest OS memory. The second module utilizes developed 
kernel object profiles during dynamic monitoring and 
introspection of malicious code execution and determines 
invariants values over kernel object’s features to generate the 
evasion-resistant malware signature. 
A. Robust Features Identification 
Robust features are properties in monitored malicious 
kernel objects that effectively contribute to the execution of 
malicious code and assist in producing evasion-resistant 
detection signature. Identifying robust features is the core 
component in the proposed signature development approach. 
Since numerous features may be considered as viable 
candidates to the signature development process, only a 
limited number of features are effectively contribute to robust 
signature development. For example, EPROCESS kernel 
object and its substructure objects hold up to 2000 features 
based on the OS version [11]. Some of these features are 
unused or used in specific circumstances and others are prone 
to manipulation by malicious code.  That is, unused features or 
features prone to manipulation threat the signature integrity 
and assist in producing signatures that can be evaded if an 
appropriate evasion technique employed. Thus, locating 
features in kernel objects that allow in robust signature 
development is an inevitable portion of the proposed 
approach.  
In our implementation, a derivate of dynamic monitoring of 
kernel data structures using Virtual Machine Introspection 
(VMI) technique proposed in [5] has been used to identify 
robust features in the kernel objects. The key idea of the 
robust feature identification process is based on how important 
these features are to malicious code execution. Features that 
are accessed or modified while malware is being executed are 
more likely to be relevant to the malicious code execution, 
relative to features that are never accessed. Similarly, features 
that, if modified, will cause malware to misbehave, are more 
likely to have a strong relevancy to malicious code execution, 
than features, if changed, do not alter malware behavior. 
To identify robust features in EPROCESS kernel object 
that used in signature development process, we developed a 
dynamic monitoring component for EPROCESS kernel object 
features using (VMI) to identify whether EPROCESS’s 
features have been accessed or modified during malware 
execution process. We have customized a version of QEMU 
emulator [12], a fast processor emulator using dynamic code 
translation, to implement a kernel object memory monitoring. 
We instruct the customized QEMU to create an Event Traces 
for memory reads and writes routines that are part of the 
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) component shown in Figure 
1. Event tracer allows tracing dynamic changes on kernel 
object features through monitoring memory Reads and Writes 
operations over memory regions allocated to the kernel 
object’s features. Thus, if a memory region represents a 
malicious code kernel object is accessed or modified, an event 
is triggered to describe the offset of the memory region and 
the operation used to access the offsets. These logs are 
examined later and mapped to the definition of the 
EPROCESS kernel data structure to determine what features 
were accessed or modified and how often. Based on the results 
of tracing dynamic changes to memory regions allocated to 
kernel objects’ features, VMI event tracer determines robust 
features per malware sample that will be considered in the 
profiling process and will contribute in producing an evasion-
resistant malware detection signature. 
B. Malicious Kernel Objects Profiling 
In the profiling process, we profile kernel object features 
during malicious code execution. These profiles primarily 
describe the characteristics of monitored malicious kernel 
objects’ features that are analogous to malware execution 
semantics in different execution states.  
 
Figure 1: System Overview 
 
 
Figure 2: Kernel Object Profiling During Malicious Code 
Execution 
 
This process encompasses the execution of malicious code 
binaries in a controlled environment [13-16] to identify the 
malicious code information flow and executed system calls 
(syscalls). Since system calls are the main interface for 
programs to interact with the operating system kernel, we use 
system calls invocation procedure as a trigger for the profiling 
procedure. Unlike other systems that model malware behavior 
by specifying system calls execution sequences, we only use 
system calls invocation to trigger the process of profiling 
identified robust features in kernel objects. Unfortunately, 
systems relying on malware behavior profiling based on, only, 
system calls sequences are prone to different attacks such as 
insertion of irrelevant calls or call sequence re-ordering [17].  
Thus, to avoid such shortcoming, the proposed profiling 
process solely consider system calls invocations as an initiate 
to an execution state with no regards to the calls execution 
sequence. 
In this research, we defined a formalism to describe the 
process of kernel objects profiling in the context of malicious 
program execution. Malicious code control flow is represented 
in a finite state automata [17] model   that describes the  
malicious program behavior, where each state is labeled with a 
system call used by malware code to interact with the 
operating system kernel and edges are transitions that 
represent the dynamic control flow and determine the 
dependencies between states.  
 
Definition. A malicious code behavior          is a 
finite sequence of states               in S such that  
  and 
     with     , and L is labeling procedure         , 
in which      is an atomic proposition that is true at the 
execution of the system call    syscalls.  
 
In essence, invocation of a system call   causes changes to the 
control properties of a kernel object O, in which the operating 
system kernel changes the object O in way to permit it to 
execute  . Hence, we define invocation of   as a function that 
stimulates changing values of various properties (robust 
features) {          } in malicious kernel object      from 
{             } into {             }, such that, the features 
values hold after invocation of   uniquely define the 
characteristics of      robust feature at state s( ). The 
profiling procedure used to capture changes to      at 
invocation of   is defined as     , where the function 
    over    is defined as                       . 
Finally, the result of      robust feature profiling process are 
stored in the object snapshots profile repository , such 
that,   ⟦    〈  〉     〈  〉        〈  〉⟧ .    
 
Based on the previous discussion, we define a malicious code 
profiling process , more formally, as:   〈     〉, such 
that: 
   is a set of malicious code execution states where 
each state labeled with a system call  . 
   is a profiling procedure that monitor the dynamic 
changes to the features of a malicious kernel object 
     and capture the characteristics of object      
after invocation of  . 
   is a repository of profiles related to a malicious 
kernel object      that hold at different system calls 
invocations. 
 
Intuitively, the profiling process encodes the characteristics 
of malicious kernel object features at system call invocations. 
This means extracted profiles will represent malicious code 
execution from the kernel object data structure perspective. 
These profiles do not include specific information about 
malicious code syntax or execution sequence of malicious 
system calls. That is, the profiles are less vulnerable to 
obfuscation methods and evasion techniques that rely on 
manipulating code syntax.  
Practically, the process of malicious kernel object profiling 
is implemented at the Kernel Object Profiler (KOP) module as 
shown in Figure 1. KOP is a set of kernel device drivers that 
monitor invocation of the kernel systems calls invoked from 
malicious processes in memory throughout system call table 
hooking [18, 19]. This includes, monitoring systems calls that 
used in different aspects of the malicious programs execution, 
such as process and thread creation, malicious DLL loads and 
file, registry, network operations. Once malicious system call 
is invoked, the locations of the robust features belongs to  
malicious kernel object in memory are requested from the 
VMM, followed by an acquisition of the robust features’ 
values from the guest operating system’s memory. Note that, 
an assistant procedure defined as a provisional suppression of 
malicious code execution after system call invocations until 
the acquisitions of the robust features’ values is defined to 
allow consistent profiling and protect the features’ values of 
being overwritten before the completion of features’ values 
acquisition. 
Figure 2 depicts an excerpt from a profiled malicious kernel 
object while malicious code is being executed. In this graph, 
one can see various invoked system calls by the malicious 
code to obtain handle of a malicious process and get an access 
to the process token to probe a processes-space in memory. 
The profiling procedure in KOP is stimulated, once the VMM 
notify KOP with a notification routine of invoked system call 
and its arguments, to profile a snapshot of kernel objects’ 
robust features that represent malicious code in memory. 
Finally, the profiling procedure adds profiled kernel object 
features’ snapshot to the kernel object repository space. This 
repository space is a set of profiles representing characteristics 
of malicious kernel objects in the context of malware 
execution at different system calls invocations. 
Note that, the vector length of a profile snapshot is 
determined through the robust feature identification process, 
as previously explained.  For example, the length of a single 
snapshot varies from 100 robust features to 500 features. 
Similarly, the length of a malicious object repository space is 
determined based on the number of invoked system calls by 
malicious code. 
C. Signature Generation 
During malicious kernel object profiling process, numerous 
profile snapshots are obtained that uniquely characterize 
malicious object at each invoked system call. However, each 
profile snapshot represents a timely-specific characteristic of 
the malicious code behavior. In other words, it preserves the 
malicious kernel data structure characteristics at specific 
execution state. Thus, to aggregate obtained profiles and 
represent all execution states, an aggregation process is 
proposed to assemble the profile snapshots, and detect 
invariants features’ values obtained in the profiles acquisition 
process. In the profiles aggregation process, we used the 
concept of Dynamic Invariant Detection [20]. This concept is 
proposed to detect likely invariants in a user space program 
execution by instrumenting the source programs to trace 
variables of interest through program execution over a set of 
test cases. In the proposed approach, we use a simplified 
version of a dynamic invariant detector [20], where inputs to 
the detector is comprised of obtained profile snapshots from 
malicious code profiling process. The profile snapshots are 
examined by several test cases using different constraints and 
examination templates to detect invariant values of monitored 
robust features. An example for a constraint used to detect 
invariants in profiled malicious kernel object is a constant 
value for a specific robust feature, or a linear relationship 
between two features, given that they are present in all 
snapshot profiles. Another example is a value for a specific 
feature being in a specific range during malicious code 
information flow. Consequently, applying invariant detection 
process on obtained profile snapshots produces a profile that 
represents a unique invariants characteristic of malicious 
kernel objects features that holds over the life time of malware 
execution.  
Finally, produced profile is used as a signature to detect 
malware programs throughout scanning the dynamic kernel 
objects belong to a malicious executable in memory and 
matching characteristics of scanned dynamic kernel object 
with produced profiles.  
 
III. EVALUATION   
Several test cases performed to evaluate the efficiency of 
SigGENE and to prove that produced profiles are resistant to 
evasion and obfuscation techniques.  
Two different experiments were conducted to evaluate the 
proposed approach. In the first experiment, a program 
simulating a kernel-mode rootkit is developed to launches a 
dynamic kernel object manipulation attack (DKOM) [21] and 
hides a different malicious processes running in user-mode. 
Additionally, developed rootkit-simulator has been obfuscated 
using 3 different methods to determine if generated profile 
signature is capable of detecting obfuscated variants. Note 
that, used code obfuscation methods were obfuscation by 
encryption, code re-ordering and instruction substitution [2]. 
The result of code obfuscation process was generation of 13 
different variants of developed rootkit-simulator. The second 
experiment was conducted on real-world malware samples 
[22] from different samples families. Each sample family has 
up to 17 variants and executes the same functionalities, with a 
total number of 63 test samples. All samples have been 
scanned with two different AV detectors; the detectors, 
however, failed to detect 19 samples variants while developed 
profile signatures successfully detected all samples variants 
and obfuscated versions of the lab rootkit-simulator.  
The signature development process has been verified in 
different versions of Windows operating system to evaluate 
the kernel object profiling accuracy in different object’s 
definitions.  
Malicious Kernel Objects’ Profiles Characteristics 
 
Sample 
Family 1 
 
Sample 
Family 2 
 
Sample 
Family 3 
 
Sample 
Family 4 
 
Sample 
Family 5 
Lab 
Rootkit-
Simulator 
Family 
#Average Robust features 253 348 211 283 147 118 
#Average Obtained profile snapshots 277 513 293 375 256 188 
#Average read operations over robust features 9365 11975 7132 9844 8401 6121 
#Average write operations over robust features 2499 3730 1981 2373 1192 958 
# Signature detection false positives/negatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 1: Malicious Kernel Objects Profiling Results 
 
 
 
The profiling process was developed in Windows XP SP3 and 
Windows 7 SP1.We observed that identified robust features in 
Windows 7 were more comprehensive in describing the 
characteristics of malicious kernel object.  The vector length 
of features included in profiled snapshots was extended since 
EPROCESS kernel object definition in Windows 7 is slightly 
different compared to previous Windows versions and 
contains more flags that controls programs execution. 
The results of the experiments, given above in Table 1, 
describe and present the outputs of the profiling process for 
the test malware samples and developed rootkit-simulator 
used in SigGENE evaluation. The robust features results 
section presents features that are determined to be used in 
kernel object profiling process based on their contribution in 
malicious code execution process. Obtained profile snapshots 
section shows produced number of profile snapshots upon 
invocation of various system calls per malicious code 
execution run. As such, malicious code execution run 
represents the process of monitoring malicious code execution 
starting from the creation of a malicious process until 
malicious process termination. Finally, Read and Write 
operations over robust features section provides an indication 
on how determined features are relevant to the execution of 
malicious process and describe the numbers of dynamic 
changes of robust features’ values in malicious kernel object 
throughout malicious code execution. Note that, presented 
numbers is the average of sample evaluation and its variants.  
In the verification process, generated profiles used as a 
signature were also verified using several benign kernel 
objects representing user-mode programs and malicious kernel 
objects representing malware samples that were not a part of 
test cases, as well. All test cases did not produce false 
positives or negatives and generated profiles produced 
accurate results in detecting intended samples.  
Throughout the profiling process, we analyzed obtained 
profile snapshots for each test sample. A core observation was 
that each profile snapshot has a unique set of feature values 
that uniquely characterize the execution state itself. For 
example, while investigating the test lab rootkit-simulator 
snapshot profiles, no profile snapshot was identical to other 
snapshots and values of at least 20 robust features are unique 
compared to other profile snapshots and to other objects 
profile spaces. Thus, we argue that we can, not only, develop a 
signature to detect malware and its variant based on kernel 
object profiles, but also, identify system calls that have been 
invoked by malware, if profile snapshots information 
employed in malware forensic investigation analysis.  
Furthermore, in the profiling process we observed 
similarities between profiles extracted while invocation of 
system calls belong to same group family, i.e.  networking or 
memory related system calls. For example, system calls used 
to probe or attach to user address space of other processes in 
memory such as KeStackAttachProcess [11] changes 
the values of Token feature and debug flag to a unique 
value that enabled us to determine that a process probe related 
system calls have been invoked.  
By utilizing these observations, we can characterize malicious 
attacks based on similarities of profiles obtained during the 
attack execution.  For example, in an experiment designated to 
analyze three different rootkit samples launching a DKOM 
attack, we observed partial similarities between profiles 
extracted through execution of system calls related to the 
attack. Therefore, we argue that the proposed approach can be 
extended to detect unknown samples based on profiling the 
characteristics of malicious attacks. 
  
IV. DISCUSSION  
SigGENE is a signature-based malware detection approach, 
primarily designed to detect obfuscated malware and malware 
variants through profiling malicious dynamic kernel objects.  
Although signatures developed based on kernel object profiles 
demonstrate promising results in the evaluation phase, 
SigGENE prototype is confronted with a number of 
limitations, which are being addressed in our on-going work.  
 
 Profiling Performance: SigGENE traces memory access 
using a VM monitoring module as a basis for the robust 
feature identification process. This process is both time-
consuming and computationally expensive in profiling 
stage. Thus, our work in-progress includes a lightweight 
process memory monitor based on tracing memory page 
access on page fault errors from the operating system 
memory manager, instead of tracing read and write 
operations directly from the VM using Event Tracer.       
 Behavior Monitoring: We monitor malware execution by 
hooking the operating system calls. However, some anti-
analysis methods employed by malware do detect 
monitoring-based hooking. Thus, SigGENE may produce 
inaccurate profiles if the sample employs such methods. 
To overcome this shortcoming, we are moving the kernel 
object profiler and monitor component from the operating 
system kernel internals to outside by implementing the 
monitoring functionalities in the VM monitoring layer. 
This type of monitoring and profiling will as a result be 
transparent to malware samples under investigation. 
 Kernel Objects: The current scope of the proposed 
approach is limited to profile EPROCESS kernel data 
structures; one suggested improvement is to include 
additional kernel objects such as FILE_OBJECTS and 
VAD. We believe that inclusion of different kernel 
objects will yield to deeper and unique profiles 
generation, which will lead to improve malware behavior 
characterization. 
 Profiling Samples and Attack: Currently proposed 
approach profiles kernel malware samples and its 
variants. The evaluation results, however, demonstrated 
the possibility of profiling malicious attacks through the 
observation of kernel objects while invoking malicious 
system calls to perform a specific attack. Thus, our future 
work will includes an extension to the proposed approach 
to include malicious attacks profiling. 
 
V. RELATED WORK 
While signature-based detection has been studied for 
decades, malware detection based on behavioral profiling and 
defeating code obfuscation has become increasingly important 
in recent years. Various approaches have been proposed to 
characterize malware behaviors based on code execution flow 
[23-25]. However, such approaches were confronted with 
different obfuscation methods that elude malware analysis and 
traditional signature-based detectors.  
Panorama proposed a malicious code information tracking 
approach using taint-based information flow method to 
understand how data can be manipulated by the malicious 
code. However, this approach suffered from control flow 
evasion attacks that break a taint-based information flow 
method [26], hence, Panorama’s detection engine will not be 
able to detect variants employing this evasion method. 
Similarly, K-Tracer proposed a backward-forward slicing 
techniques on simulated kernel event traces to extract malware 
goals and functionalities [27]. However the proposed method 
requires prior determination of the data on which to perform 
the slicing operation. Another approach that profiles malware 
behavior was PoKer [28] which proposed a context tracking 
method to trace rootkit execution and extract a behavioral 
profile based on these execution traces. Although the approach 
can effectively profile different rootkit behaviors, extracted 
profile is, unfortunately, based on execution syntax and 
vulnerable to obfuscation methods. 
An improved method to profile rootkit behavior was 
proposed in [29]. DataGene proposed a memory data access 
pattern extraction approach to characterize the malware 
behavior. The main motivation behind DataGene was to avoid 
dependence on control flow execution to develop behavioral 
profiles. Thus, DataGene proposed a monitoring mechanism 
to access patterns of data resident in memory that belongs to 
the malicious code and extract unique access patterns that 
characterize malware execution. The limitation of this 
approach is that data access pattern is subject to the execution 
constraints and its environmental parameters, and hence it is 
not robust enough to be used as a malware signature. A similar 
profiling approach based on data access patterns was proposed 
in [30]. KILMAX correlates memory write patterns to normal 
distribution of user-issued key stokes to profile and detect 
key-logger malware. 
Perhaps the most research work relevant to the proposed 
approach was presented in [31]. Gibraltar by Baliga et al. takes 
advantage of data structure invariant inferences by generating a 
graph of kernel objects in memory and, then, derives 
constraints over the object data. Observed deviations from the 
inferred invariants are considered attacks against the kernel 
data structure.  In essence, the goal and a number of limitations 
that were discovered in Gibraltar make our approach and our 
implementation substantially different. Whereas Gibraltar 
profiles attacks to be able detect it, our approach profiles 
malware semantics to produce a robust detection signature and 
defeat obfuscation methods. Additionally, Gibraltar fetches the 
kernel data structure from the memory without filtering kernel 
object features based on relevance to the attack semantics. 
Consequently, a number of unnecessary features will be 
included in behavior profiling which is an issue regarding the 
precision of the generated profiles. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Traditional signature based detection techniques can be 
bypassed using malicious code obfuscation or packing, since 
features used in signature development are vulnerable to 
manipulation and tampering by malicious code.   
In this research paper, we propose a novel method to 
develop a malware signature that is resistant to obfuscation 
techniques. The proposed signature is based on kernel object 
characteristics while avoiding dependency on specific 
malicious code information that may utilize to evade 
developed signatures. In addition, a method is proposed to 
identify kernel object’s features that effectively contribute to 
the development of a robust malware detection signature. 
Kernel object profiling and an invariant detection method are, 
also, proposed to assist the process of evasion-resistant 
signature development. 
To support the proposed approach, a prototype tool is 
developed to produce malware detection signatures based on 
obtained profiles. Experiments using real-world obfuscated 
malware samples show the effectiveness of developed 
signatures in detecting malware variants and obfuscated 
malicious code. 
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